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Metz: Abandoning Counterinsurgency

Introduction
Over the past fifty years the US military’s interest in counterinsurgency has
ebbed and flowed, reflecting broader shifts in American grand strategy and
the global security environment.1 The first US “counterinsurgency era” began
in the early 1960s when policymakers recognized the Soviet Union and China
were inspiring or directly supporting left-leaning insurgencies to weaken the
West, and to do so with less risk than direct military confrontation.2
Southeast Asia soon became the primary laboratory. After the United States
withdrew from Vietnam though, the military purged its counterinsurgency
knowledge and capability only to rebuild it partly in the 1980s when Soviet
backed insurgent movements were on the rise again, most importantly in El
Salvador.3 By the 1990s, the United States again abandoned
counterinsurgency, assuming it was a legacy of the Cold War that would fade
to irrelevance with the demise of the Soviet Union.4 Insurgencies lingered in
the Americas, Africa, and Asia; but without sponsors, most seemed irrelevant
to Washington.5 When the United States military was deployed to the
Balkans, peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency became the central
component of what was then known as “low intensity conflict” and later
“military operations other than war.”
When the September 11 attacks on the United States and President George W.
Bush’s subsequent Global War on Terrorism” led to US intervention in Iraq
and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency came roaring back, beginning what

For a succinct explanation, see Paul B. Rich, “A Historical Overview of US CounterInsurgency Policy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 1 (2014): 5–40.
2 See Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance,
1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977).
3 See Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The
Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1991); Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War—An
Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1998); and Andrew J. Bacevich et al., American
Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Washington: PergamonBrassey’s, 1988).
4 For detail, see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American
Capability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995).
5 One of the rare exceptions was the communist insurgency in Colombia, but US concern
was more about the insurgents’ involvement in narcotrafficking than their dilapidated
ideology.
1
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David Ucko called a “new counterinsurgency era.”6 But this iteration was
different. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were initially intended to be short
stabilization operations following the removal of hostile regimes. They only
evolved into counterinsurgency when opponents of the new, Americanbacked governments adopted the techniques of Cold War insurgents.7
From 2003 onward, the US military rediscovered, updated, and applied Cold
War era counterinsurgency concepts, turned them into updated Service and
Joint doctrine, and developed organizations and capabilities to implement the
new doctrine.8 This approach took extensive effort since the Army’s
inclination after Vietnam was to resist involvement in counterinsurgency.9
Partly because of this resistance, the revival of counterinsurgency took several
years. Even so, it was the fastest such adaptation of a conventional force in
history.10
During this process, though, the United States never seriously debated
whether Cold War-style counterinsurgency made strategic sense in Iraq and
Afghanistan—whether it was a universal approach or a time- and situationspecific one. Because extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan were doing things
that looked like twentieth-century insurgency, American strategists simply
David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for
Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). On the integration
of counterinsurgency into the Global War on Terror, see Robert M. Cassidy,
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
7 On the initial coalescence of the Iraq insurgency, see Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Hashim,
“Insurgency in Iraq 2003–10,” in The Routledge Handbook to Insurgency and Counter
Insurgency, ed. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012). On the
Afghan insurgency, see Antonio Giustozzi,” Insurgency in Afghanistan,” in Rich and
Duyvesteyn, Routledge Companion; and Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop:
The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007).
8 Unlike the period between Vietnam and the 1980s, or from the early 1990s to 2005,
Joint and service counterinsurgency doctrine continues to be updated on a regular
schedule. While new revisions will be published soon, the current versions are US Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2013); and Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Insurgencies and
Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).
9 See Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the
American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).
10 See Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq
War (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Other government agencies
revived their counterinsurgency concepts as well. See US Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence
Agency, 2009); and US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S.
Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs).
6
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dusted off Cold War counterinsurgency and revised it.11 This worked in Iraq to
an extent. After several years of bloody and expensive fighting, the insurgency
was battered to the point the Iraqi government could have finished it off by
institutionalizing political and economic reform and continuing to
professionalize its security forces.12 That the Iraqi government failed to do so
hints at deep flaws in the American approach to counterinsurgency.
The US campaign in Afghanistan was less successful. The conflict there was a
lower priority than that in Iraq, so stabilization and reconstruction programs
were under resourced. Afghanistan had a much weaker national identity and
professional class than Iraq, making the job of supporting counterinsurgency
more difficult. And the Afghan insurgents had two of the things a successful
insurgency needs: a lucrative funding source (opium) and an external
sanctuary the United States has been unable to shut down (Pakistan).13
Today, US involvement in Afghanistan is at a much lower level than a few
years ago. But, there is no sign Kabul will be able to contain, much less defeat,
the insurgents any time soon. Even so, American political leaders continue to
bet on counterinsurgency, apparently believing if the precise US troop levels
and missions are found, it eventually will work.
In reality it will not, mostly because there is a much bigger issue at play:
Afghanistan demonstrates the American conceptualization of
counterinsurgency, born in the Cold War and resuscitated without a
fundamental revision after the September 11 attacks, has reached the end of

Daniel Marston, “Lessons in 21st Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001–
2007,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter
Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey, 2008).and Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq:
May 2003-January 2007,” in Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency.
12 See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the
Struggle For Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon, 2012).
13 While the so-called surge is often credited with breaking the Iraq insurgency (e.g.
Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History [New York: Encounter, 2009]), it
actually took a combination of factors including some success constricting support for the
insurgency from Syria and Iran, the growing effectiveness of the US special operations
effort, and significant improvement in the Iraqi security forces. Steven Metz,
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007 (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010). On the special operations campaign, see
Sean Naylor, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of the Joint Special Operations
Command (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015); Mark Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive
True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq (New York: St Martin’s, 2012); and
Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio/Penguin,
2013).
11
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its lifespan.14 The Army, the Joint Force, and the rest of the US government
now must do what it failed to do after September 11 and seriously examine the
assumptions, conceptual foundations, and strategic effectiveness of
counterinsurgency. This analysis will demonstrate counterinsurgency is
unacceptably inefficient and should be abandoned in favor of a new method of
antiterrorism that better reflects the domestic political situation and the
dynamics of the twenty-first-century global security environment.

How We Got Here
While the United States has a long tradition of small wars against irregular
opponents and implemented a form of counterinsurgency in the Philippines
between 1899 and 1902, counterinsurgency did not become a central
component of American grand strategy until the 1960s.15 Worried by Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 speech endorsing “wars of
national liberation,” the eroding security situation in Laos and South
Vietnam, the consolidation of Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba, the French
defeat in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist insurgencies in Colombia
and Venezuela, President John Kennedy concluded the Soviets were taking
indirect aggression against the West using leftist insurgencies. This decision
made counterinsurgency strategically significant.
The rationale for US involvement in counterinsurgency grew from ideas like
the “domino theory” and the “death by a thousand small cuts” notion popular
among French strategic theorists.16 Revolutionary war, this group believed,
had become the dominant form of conflict in the late twentieth-century.
Defeats for pro-Western nations, even in places appearing unimportant could
aggregate into global Soviet victory. With a military stalemate in Europe and
communist expansion checked in Korea, the Cold War had devolved to a

For an elaboration of this argument, see Gian P. Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s
Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013), 113–35
15 David E. Johnson, “You Go to COIN with the Military You Have: The United States and
250 Years of Irregular War,” in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles
and Strategic Cultures, ed. Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016). On how the Philippines affected US thinking about
counterinsurgency, see Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). For the closest thing to American
counterinsurgency doctrine before the Cold War, see US Marine Corps, Small Wars
Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940).
16 Peter Paret, “The French Army and La Guerre Révolutionnaire,” Survival 1, no. 1
(1959): 25–32, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396335908440119; and Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and
Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger, 1964).
14
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series of Third World skirmishes. The strategic significance of insurgency was
symbolic and perceptual as an indicator of historic trends.
To respond, Kennedy ordered a wide-ranging expansion of US
counterinsurgency capabilities. He first formed a cabinet level
Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal Defense Policy to develop
a unified counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate efforts across the
government.17 The Pentagon created an Office on Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities headed by Major General Victor H. Krulak (USMC), giving
him direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.18
The military services integrated counterinsurgency into their professional
educational systems and established training centers for it. Army Special
Forces were expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.19
Even the State Department and the Agency for International Development
began to take counterinsurgency seriously, albeit with less enthusiasm than
the military.20
From its inception, though, US thinking about counterinsurgency had a
heterogeneous intellectual foundation. One important element was the
French notion of guerre révolutionnaire, which viewed insurgency as EastWest proxy conflict. A second element was the belief that counterinsurgency
required holistic stabilization and political reform rather than simply
battlefield victory and thus needed a tightly integrated military, political,
informational, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement effort. This idea
came from British pacification campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and elsewhere,
as well as from French officers who fought insurgents in Indochina and
Algeria.21

Charles Maechling, Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Low Intensity
Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed.
Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 26–27.
18 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William
Morrow, 1994), 736
19 Army Special Forces were created to undertake unconventional warfare behind Soviet
lines during a major conflict in Europe.
20 U. Alexis Johnson, “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service,” Foreign Service
Journal 39, no. 7 (July 1962): 21–22; and Henry C. Ramsey, “The Modernization Process
and Insurgency,” Foreign Service Journal 39, no. 6 (June 1962), 21–23.
21 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and
Vietnam (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A
French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger, 1964); and David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964.)
17
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The third component of American counterinsurgency was the theory of
modernization borrowed from academia.22 Derived in part from the writings
of German sociologist Max Weber, modernization theory was based on the
idea that the natural path for developing societies was from traditional
economic, political, and social organizations to “modern” ones relying on
bureaucratic administration with professional credentials and expertise
rather than familial or traditional authorities.
As Americans grappled with insurgency, modernization theory provided an
overarching intellectual framework. Policymakers and strategists concluded
the difficult and complex transition from traditional to “modern” societies
and political systems created tensions and conflicts. Modernization saw the
political awakening of previously passive segments of society, such as the
rural peasantry and marginalized ethnic, sectarian, or racial groups. Often
traditional structures of order decayed more rapidly than modern ones
developed.23 All these factors provided opportunities for revolutionary
movements. If revolutionaries could not seize power through a Bolshevikstyle putsch, one alternative was a protracted, rural insurgency based on an
extensive political underground, information warfare and propaganda,
terrorism, and guerrilla operations.
Modernization theory told American counterinsurgents that success was not
simply defeating insurgent units but expanding the state’s capacity to govern
and secure its territory—in other words to do the things modernization theory
says “modern” states should do. Until a nation became modern, it could not
use political institutions to reconcile divergences among its population or
have its security forces prevent or defeat organized insurgency. Thus,
counterinsurgency required nation-building.
From the beginning, this kludge of very different ideas had internal tensions.
Conceptualizing insurgency as a form of war suggested it should be militarycentric, but if battlefield victory did not equate to strategic success, the
military could only do half the job—and, it was the easier half. Of course in
conventional war, the peace settlement determines whether battlefield
success led to strategic victory, but in counterinsurgency, what came after
battlefield success was even more difficult to determine.

M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern
Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015) 58–68.
23 For the most influential analysis of this phenomenon, see Samuel P. Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
22
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That conclusion was not the only fissure in the concept. When the British and
French undertook counterinsurgency while decolonizing, they assumed the
authority of the nation where the conflict occurred. They could impose deep
political and economic reforms even if traditional elites opposed it. Yet things
were different for the United States: it did not undertake counterinsurgency
but counterinsurgency support working through a local partner government.
That divergence means the British and French models, which were part of the
intellectual foundation of American counterinsurgency, were not fully
applicable. Neither those models nor academic modernization theory explains
how to compel a resistant local ally to undertake deep reform. In fact, as the
United States helped a partner nation expand its political, military, law
enforcement, and intelligence capability, Washington’s ability to compel
change declined. The United States never surmounted this leverage dilemma
in Vietnam or later in Iraq or Afghanistan. Current counterinsurgency
doctrine recognizes this problem but offers no solution.24
Combining academic modernization theory with British and French notions
of counterinsurgency also created organizational problems. The military
dominated America’s counterinsurgency organization even though the
ultimate solution to insurgency was nonmilitary. Despite creating large
embassies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, either the US military remained
the most important player (Vietnam, Afghanistan) or the embassy found
when most of the US military left and the insurgency was under control, it
could not convince the partner government to finalize success by continuing
deep reform (Iraq).

The Decay of Old Concepts
As American counterinsurgency was revived in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
problematic assumptions and internal tensions inherent to the concept
festered and worsened, becoming less tolerable as the strategic significance of
insurgency declined. For instance, the architects of post-September 11
counterinsurgency accepted the idea that it is a type of war; the phrase
“counterinsurgency warfare” was common. While insurgents do use armed

24

See, for instance, JCS, Counterinsurgency, VIII-8.
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action, war is not entirely military but rather military-centric.25 Insurgency,
by contrast, is designed to diminish the importance of the military realm,
primarily because the state—especially a state that has external
counterinsurgency support—is normally militarily dominant, at least at the
very end. In some ways, insurgency is more akin to premodern fighting where
the primary objective was to demonstrate the bravery of individual warriors
or capture prisoners for ritual sacrifice or slavery than to impose the political
will of one group on another. This means calling counterinsurgency “war” is
using the word euphemistically like the “war on poverty” or “war on drugs.”
This allegory makes sustaining public support difficult since Americans
expect their nation eventually to “win” in some demonstrable way.
Approaching counterinsurgency as war skews both its organization and its
expectations.
The traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency assumed partner
governments supported the Western-Weberian notion of modernization and
were willing to undertake deep reforms to become “modern.” All they needed
was a boost. Counterinsurgency had “an ideological dimension imbued with a
distinctively American liberal philosophical and political selfunderstanding.”26 From this perspective, all the United States needed to do
was provide partner governments the means to modernize.
This assumption proved accurate in some places like El Salvador, Colombia,
and the Philippines. To the architects of American counterinsurgency, that
success validated the principle, leading them to draw universal conclusions
from culture- and situation-specific circumstances. Yet in many parts of the
world—including those most prone to insurgency—the state is not a detached
reconciler using a rule set that does not favor any one segment of the society.
The body politic is not designed to balance diverse interests but to formalize
and to sustain the group holding power. Because this motive produces
resistance, Americans encouraged the local elite to transform the political,
legal, and economic systems into something reflecting the Western notion of
fairness or, as it is often phrased, good governance. But, such entreaties ask
Some scholars treat nonviolent strategic social movements as a type of insurgency. See,
for instance, Mark Grimsley, “Why the Civil Rights Movement Was an Insurgency,”
HistoryNet, February 24, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/why-the-civil-rightsmovement-was-an-insurgency.htm. I disagree and consider insurgency a type of strategy,
which by definition includes armed force, whether semiconventional military operations,
guerrilla operations, terrorism, or most often, a blend of them. Insurgency is not military
centric but always entails violence. Steven Metz, “Rethinking Insurgency,” in Rich and
Duyvesteyn, Routledge Handbook; and Metz, “Insurgency,” in Conceptualising Modern
War, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (London: Hurst, 2011).
26 Smith and Jones, Political Impossibility, 57.
25
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elites to alter a system that benefits them, their families, and their peers. In
other words, the American approach to counterinsurgency is contingent on
partner elites acting irrationally—doing things against the interests of
themselves, their families, and their affiliates. As Joint counterinsurgency
doctrine notes, “US counterinsurgents will often have to cajole or coerce HN
[host nation] governments and entrenched elites to recognize the legitimacy
of those grievances and address them. This is especially true where reforms
would involve compromising the political and financial interests of those
elites.”27 While accurate, these elites generally undertake just enough reform
to satisfy Washington, which keeps assistance flowing without fundamentally
altering the beneficial system.
Thus another flaw with the traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency
appears: the United States seeks the complete defeat of the insurgents while
its local partners often benefit from the persistence of an insurgency large
enough to sustain American interest and assistance but not powerful enough
to overthrow them. Insurgency keeps aid flowing and gives the political elite
an excuse for repression, exclusion, and holding onto power.28 Imagine, for
instance, Afghanistan with the Taliban defeated: with little interest from the
world, the country would sink back into even more crushing poverty. Without
a stream of external assistance, Afghanistan’s professional class and political
elite would have far fewer economic opportunities. In long running conflicts,
a “war economy” usually emerges, which benefits both the elites that the
United States supports and the insurgent leaders.29 Ultimately, this rapport
means those with the power to end an insurgency—whether local elites or
counterinsurgent leaders—often have little incentive to do so; while those who
suffer the most from the conflict—the local population—do not have the
power to end it.
While US doctrine recognizes the problem, the United States has never found
a way to resolve it.30 To gain the support of the American public, US political
leaders must portray a conflict as one where supporting the local elite is an
important, even vital American interest. This commitment, combined with
the fact that many insurgency movements are, in fact, worse than America’s
partners, diminishes US leverage over its partner elite. Thus, the United
JCS, Counterinsurgency, II-19.
Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 330–31.
29 See, for instance, Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, The Political Economy of Civil
War and Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive
Conflict Management, 2005).
30 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-3.
27

28
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States is unable to compel its partners to undertake the degree of system
change that might prevent future armed resistance, but which erodes their
own power and wealth.
The United States also is hindered by the idea that the “normal” state of
affairs is for a state to exercise control over all of its national territory. In
many parts of the world—including those prone to insurgency—this is not the
norm. While governments would be happy to do so, they draw the very
rational conclusion that the benefits of exercising full control over their
national territory is not worth the costs. Thus, they focus on the areas where
the elite and its affiliates live, whether regions or parts of cities, and on the
wealth-producing parts of the nation such as economically robust urban
areas, regions with important natural resources, and transportation corridors.
They write off rural hinterlands dominated by non-elite groups, regions that
do not generate wealth, and increasingly, poorer urban areas. Elites accept
these areas are informally governed, often with little or no presence by the
formal state. The potential for armed conflict emanating from informally
governed regions always exists, but local elites make the rational decision that
tolerating that risk—and living with persistent terrorism—makes more sense
than attempting to exercise full control everywhere.
The traditional notion of counterinsurgency called on the state to undertake
economic development to undercut resentment and opposition. In other
words, the state would provide a better deal to the population than the
insurgents. This idea made sense within the context of modernization theory
as American’s first grappled with counterinsurgency. It was no coincidence
Walt Rostow—the deputy national security adviser for John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson, as well as an architect of US involvement in Vietnam—
had written a book linking the “stages” of economic growth with political
stability.31
Positing a causal relationship between economic growth and preventing or
quelling insurgency has many problems though. One is the tendency of
populations to grow faster than the creation of jobs. Many analysts have
found a correlation between youth bulges and youth un- (or under-)

Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
31
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employment as well as internal political violence.32 Even states that recognize
this interdependence often can do little about it, particularly in an era of
globalization, when the economic health of a nation is often determined by
external factors beyond its control.33 And, the causal linkage between
economic growth and insurgency oversimplifies the causes for someone
creating or joining an insurgency. Often psychological factors such as
personal grievances or the desire for personal empowerment, heroic status, or
simple boredom are as, or more, important than political factors or the
absence of economic opportunity.34 Simply creating low status jobs does not
address these psychological factors.
Today changes in the global security environment exacerbate the flawed
assumptions and the internal tensions of the traditional conceptualization of
counterinsurgency and undercut much of its remaining validity. Take the
notion that counterinsurgency requires the state to create a counternarrative
to the one propagated by insurgents. The counterinsurgency narrative,
according to Joint doctrine:
“…should contextualize what the population experiences, legitimizing
counterinsurgent actions and delegitimizing the insurgency. It is an
interpretive lens designed to help individuals and groups make decisions in
the face of uncertainty where the stakes are perceived as life and death. The
[counterinsurgency] narrative should explain the current situation and
describe how the [host nation] government will defeat the insurgency. It
should invoke relevant cultural and historical references to both justify the
actions of counterinsurgents and make the case that the government will
win.”35
Creating a coherent narrative was feasible in the twentieth-century when the
primary means of information propagation other than interpersonal
communication—authoritative written material or broadcasts—could be
See Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” Council on
Foreign Relations, April 13, 2007, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/effects-youthbulge-civil-conflicts; Henrik Urdal, “The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth
Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–2000,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004);
and Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Youth Bulges and Conflict, Technical
Brief Winter 2010 (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development).
33 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
34 Steven Metz, “Psychology of Participation in Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal,
January 27, 2012, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/psychology-ofparticipation-in-insurgency.
35 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-9.
32
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controlled, or at least largely controlled, by the state. In today’s information
saturated environment where narratives can form, grow, go dormant, and be
reborn outside the control of the state, the idea of counterinsurgents agreeing
to and implementing a narrative to influence perceptions of a conflict, as US
counterinsurgency doctrine calls for, is nostalgic at best.36 With radical
transparency and instant connectivity, there is more of a theme and meme
swarm than the development and promulgation of an agreed-upon, coherent
narrative.
State sponsorship of insurgency or provision of sanctuary to insurgents still
happens as it did during the Cold War. Think Russia and Ukraine, Pakistan
and Afghanistan, or Iran and Yemen. For the United States, though, there is
no risk of the “death of a thousand small cuts” as during the Cold War.
Insurgency is still using proxy aggression but is no longer a form of
superpower proxy conflict. In general terms, this application means
insurgency is less strategically significant than it once was.

Where Do We Go Now?
Today insurgency is most common precisely where the flawed assumptions,
conundrums, and internal tensions of the traditional notion of
counterinsurgency are the most pervasive. And, the United States security
policy has entered a time of frugality. America can no longer lavish security
resources with little regard for efficiency. This facet means counterinsurgency
has run its course. With the strategic stakes lower, it no longer makes sense
for the United States to accept the gross inefficiency and adverse benefit-cost
ratio of counterinsurgency. America must still counter irregular threats but
improve efficiency and better balance costs and benefits.
The first step is remembering the United States reengaged in
counterinsurgency after the September 11 attacks because policymakers saw it
as part of antiterrorism. Such actions were a way to eliminate sanctuaries for
extremist movements and shrink the pool of terrorist recruits. But in reality,
counterinsurgency support almost never reaches that end state. Partner
governments take American support and implement enough reforms that the
insurgency cannot overthrow them; then, the partners stop. They tolerate

For an exploration of this concept, see Steven Metz, “The Internet, New Media, and the
Evolution of Insurgency,” Parameters 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 80–90. For a more
expansive treatment of the broader phenomenon, see James Jay Carafano, Wiki at War:
Conflict in a Socially Networked World (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2012).
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simmering extremism in the hinterlands or urban slums so long as it does not
pose an existential threat to the regime.
This practice means counterinsurgency may be an effective method of
antiterrorism; however, it is not an efficient one. Today the United States
needs antiterrorism strategies that are acceptably effective but also affordable
and sustainable. To find them, policymakers must remember the threat of
nations ruled by extremists providing bases for terrorists to attack the United
States or its allies. Thus, helping create friendly governments that rule the
way the United States would prefer might be nice. But, the only necessity is
preventing terrorist power projection.
Given that, the United States should shift to something such as the Israeli
approach to extremism and terrorism. After finding out how difficult and
costly traditional pacification and counterinsurgency is and recognizing it
could never “win the hearts and minds” of the Arab populations in places like
southern Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, Israel concluded it could
tolerate extremism but not terrorism, settling for a realistic, affordable, and
sustainable approach that is not contingent on how neighboring states are
ruled. If enemies mobilize enough strength to threaten Israel directly, it
strikes at them with the most effective combination of air and land based
military power. After weakening the extremists, Israel withdraws, knowing it
may have to repeat offensive operations again if the threat reaches intolerable
levels.
This approach, which relies on the time-tested techniques of spoiling raids
and large-scale but limited duration punitive expeditions, might provide an
acceptably effective and sustainable post-counterinsurgency strategy for the
United States.37 Such an avenue clearly would require some sort of small
persistent presence using some combination of the intelligence community,
military special operations forces, overhead assets (most unmanned), and
increasingly, ground-based autonomous systems. But if al-Qaeda, the Islamic
State, or another terrorism-based extremist movement develops bases and a
power projection capability in a place like Afghanistan, Libya, or Yemen, the
United States should launch a powerful military and interagency strike force.
But America should abandon the idea that the Afghanistans, Yemens, and
Libyas of the world want to, or can become, stable, pro-American nations, or
For more on this approach, see Steven Metz, “The Case for a Punitive Expedition
against the Islamic State,” World Politics Review, February 6, 2015, available at:
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15031/the-case-for-a-punitiveexpedition-against-the-islamic-state.
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that trying to transform them is a good use of increasingly scarce security
resources. So long as transnational terrorists do not plot, train for, and launch
attacks from such nation’s soil, that is enough.
To make this approach work, the US military needs to redesign its forces and
develop strategic concepts and doctrine for limited duration, large-scale
expeditions. The key would be the ability to project Joint and interagency
forces—increasingly ones bolstered by autonomous systems—over long
distances, and repeat as necessary. The mantra for counterinsurgency has
always been “clear, hold, build.” An expeditionary antiterrorism strategy
would accept clearing is necessary, but holding and building are not worth the
costs. Adversaries would no longer believe they could draw the US military in
and wear down American will over time. Hopefully, opposing forces would be
deterred by knowing the United States could at least “clear” through largescale expeditions as many times as necessary, particularly as expeditionary
forces increasingly integrate autonomous systems. Deterrence always requires
capability, credibility, and communications. An antiterrorism strategy based
on limited duration expeditions would be credible in a way traditional
counterinsurgency is not.

Conclusion
Traditional counterinsurgency was seen as a form of war without all the
definitional attributes of war but with a dose of an old-fashioned theory of
modernization, which has been superseded in the academic world. If the
concept ever made sense, it no longer does. Counterinsurgency must be
refocused on the core security problem: transnational terrorism.
Counterinsurgency might be a way to address that problem, but it is
immensely inefficient and difficult to sustain politically. When the United
States had a surplus of defense resources and could garner public support for
anything that struck back at extremism in the emotional years immediately
after the September 11 attacks, inefficiency was tolerable. Now, it no longer is.
This turn of events suggests the United States must abandon
counterinsurgency as a tool of antiterrorism. Shifting to a strategy that
contains, weakens, and deters transnational terrorism by strategic
expeditions—large scale punitive raids, repeated if necessary—is a viable way
of meeting the criteria of minimal effectiveness, maximum efficiency, and
political sustainability.
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